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WHY DECENTRALIZATION? 
THE PUZZLE OF CAUSATION
CHANCHAL KUMAR SHARMA
ABSTRACT
Most countries especially the developing ones around the world are facing external as well as
internal  pressures  to  decentralize  and are  actually  becoming part  of the trend which  if not
universal  is  nonetheless  the  dominant  trend.  General  causes  include  systemic  forces  like
democratization and economic development; specifc causes however are different for different
countries. In some countries the policies of opening up of economy and policies devised to deal
with the challenges posed by new ‘globalized’ world are interacting with domestic political and
economic institutions in such a way so as to create incentives for decentralization. In addition
there is external pressure coming from IMF and WB who implicitly and explicitly have declared
‘decentralization’ as their most favoured policy prescription especially for the developing world.
Introduction:
There is a world wide trend toward increasing transfer of power, resources
and responsibilities to the subnational levels of government. Both federal and
unitary countries,  whether industrialized or developing are moving toward
more decentralization. Decentralization can appear in form of devolution of
major  functional  responsibilities,  major  increases  in  fscal t ransfers t o
subnational  governments  thus  collectively  ceding  the  fscal i mpact t o
subcentral  entities.  Decentralization  can  also  appear  in  form  of  more
administrative  autonomy  to  subcentral  /noncentral  levels  relative  to  the
central control or fnally it can appear as a shift from appointed to elected
subnational  governments  thereby  assigning  these  levels  the  political
functions  of  governance  such  as  representation.  Decentralization  in  fact
alters  the  structure  of  governance  by  shifting  the  structure  of  local
accountability  from  central  to  local  constituents,  and  also  (as Aaron
Schneider, 2003 puts it) by “changing the geographical boundaries of political
contestation and by altering the relative  power of  different  actors  and by
changing the location of government interaction with society.”
Central  governments  across  the  globe  are  decentralizing  functions  and
responsibilities  to  the lower  levels.  Fiscal  Decentralization  is  in  vogue.  A
worldwide trend towards greater fscal decentralization that began in  190’s
with many  developing  countries  embarking  on  the path  to  devolve  more
functions to the local jurisdictions, gained momentum during 1o’s.  Section I
examines  this  worldwide  trend  in  detail  and  section  II  looks  into  the
explanatory  causes  behind  this  trend.  As  globalization  is  often  correlated
with the decentralization trend, the globalization-decentralization nexus is
analysed  separately  in section  III.  Next  section  (section IV)  explores  how
federal  systems  are  responding  to  the  rapidly  changing  scenario.  While
talking of the current trend toward decentralization and the causes behind,
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 the discussion would be incomplete if the role of IMF and WB is left out.
Thus the last section (section V) briefy comments on this role.  The main
arguments are summarized in the conclusion.  
I.  The Worldwide Trend: 
The  overlapping  issues  of  fscal f ederalism and decentralization that had
earlier received little attention on part of political scientists and economists 
became the theme of international professional interest by  110’s and have
continued to attract attention of the specialists and policy makers ever since.
Paul Smoke (200 ) asserts that during the  110s, fscal decentralization and
local government reform have become among the most widespread trends in
development.  Central  governments  around  the  world  are  decentralizing
fscal, p olitical a nd a dministrative r esponsibilities t o l ower l evel
governments and to the private sector. 
The current trend can be seen as a fnal stage of the dialectical movement of
the development paradigm. Till  mid  190s there was  a trend in favour of
more economic  role  for  the state  (this  paradigm gave rise  to  the extreme
forms of centralization). The centralized decision making was seen as a way
to  ‘rationalize  scarce  resources  and  depoliticize  the  masses’  while
decentralization was viewed as likely to heighten cleavages; political radical
ethnic and religious. The second phase emerged in late  190s and early  110s
accompanying an obsession with curtailing the economic role of  the state
and reducing the size of the public sector, as these were seen as major causes
for  fnancial crisis in the developing countries. The public sector far from
being regarded as engine of development came to be perceived as an obstacle
to it. There was a fascination with the private sector. (Privatization is seen as
extreme  form  of  decentralization).  By  mid   110s,  however,  a  renewed
appreciation  of  the  public  sector’s  development  role  began  to  emerge.
Economic development literature has over the past decade re-discovered the
importance of public sector that is sub-national in focus. 
This trend, according to Ter-Minassian ( 117), is evident not only in federal
countries but also in many unitary countries including some that have a long
tradition of centralist government. Political developments in Latin America,
Asia and Africa point toward a trend en route for increasing decentralization.
The trend is visible in post communist Central  and Eastern Europe (CEE).
The trend can also be observed even in essentially centralized countries such
as Jordan and Morocco.  Countries like India, Mexico and Pakistan are also
trying to improve upon their fscal federal arrangements to make them more
responsive and effcient.   Certain studies have shown that out of the 77
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 developing and transition countries with populations greater than 7 million,
63 have embarked on some form of fscal decentralization ( Helmsing,  111,
Robert D.Ebel, 200 ). Decentralization strategies are also being worked out
in  industrialized  countries  to  formulate  policies  in  accordance  with  local
priorities. For instance, in United Kingdom, both Scotland and Wales opted
(under the Blair Government) for their own regional parliaments. In Spain
also  there  is  a  shift  of  powers  to  regional  governments.  Addressing  the
challenge of devising best achievable array of assignment of functions and
responsibilities is, in words of Richard Bird ( 113) “…a question at the centre
of policy debate in countries around the world.”    
On  basis  of  such  escalating  trend  toward  decentralization,  World  Bank’s
World  Development  Report  ( 111)  asserts--  “localization”  (the  growing
economic and political  power of subnational  entities)—as one of the most
important trends of the new century. The report states that globalization and
localization  are  simultaneously  transforming  the  development  landscape.
This trend has come to be known as “glocalization” 2, obviously a problematic
term, but which attempts to signify a strategic trend that has emerged for
creation of a more stable and just world. Earlier in  110 the U.S Agency for
International Development had identifed such trends as “the establishment
of  open markets  and  the movement  toward  more  accountable  democratic
governance.” (USAID,  110 p ).  
However, the WB report ( 111) adds that this is happening at the cost of the
nation  state. According  to  the  report,  the  global  economy  has  unleashed
economic  and  political  factors  strengthening  both  international  and  local
pressures at the expense of the traditional nation state. Thus it is argued that
such trends indicate a movement towards beginning of the end of the Nation
States and rise of regional economies, signifying that the city or “citistate”
(Ohamae  117) is becoming the principle actor in the global economy. This
kind  of  analysis  suggests  that  as  a  consequence  of  globalization  national
economic sovereignty is weakening. Such thesis fnds support in the analysis
of  Kahler  and  Lake  (2003)  and  Michael  J  Hiscox  (2003).  The  argument
generally  put  forward  by  such  scholars  is  that  globalization-  defned
narrowly  as  “economic  integration  in  international  system”  has  created
pressure  for  relocation of  decision  making  authority  away  from the state.
Thus there is  a change in location or  site of governance.  States  are either
delegating  more  responsibility  over  decision  making  “upwards”  to
supranational  institutions  or  devolving  decision  making  powers
“downwards” to sub national political units.In fact the trend whereby a large
number  of  developing  and transitional  countries  have embarked  on some
form of decentralization programmes, is coupled with growing interest in the
role of civil society and the private sector as partners to the governments in
seeking new ways of service delivery 
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(UNO,   116  P.7).  Thus  it  would  of  immense  interest  to  look  into  the
literature  to probe the causes  working  behind this  world wide movement
toward decentralization.
II. The Causes:
Literature has spilled over the academic circles to investigate the causes and
motivations behind such a trend.  The current fondness for decentralization
according  to  Aaron  Schneider  (2003)  began  during  the   190’s  and
represented a striking reversal from the advice that dominated earlier ideas of
development  where  centralized  decision  making  was  seen  as  a  way  to
rationalize  scarce  resources  and  depoliticize  the  masses  while
decentralization was viewed as likely to heighten cleavages; political, racial,
ethnic and religious.  During  190’s the tide began to turn and pressure to
decentralize  began  to  rise.  Stagnant  economies  and  ineffcient c entral
bureaucracies led researchers to reconsider centralization as a solution to the
problems  of  developing  countries  and  multilateral  institutions  began  to
include decentralization components in their programmes.
Though it is not easy to understand in a systemic way where the impetus for
decentralization  is  coming  from  (Yilmaz  and  Ebel,  2002)  yet  the  recent
adoption of decentralizing policies in countries  throughout the developing
world has led scholars to focus attention on the broad, systemic forces behind
decentralization. 
One of the most salient hypotheses about decentralization to emerge in the
contemporary  period  traces  the  adoption  of  decentralizing  policies  to
democratization (Bird  and  Vaillancourt   119;  IDB   117;  Nickson   117).
According  to  this  argument,  the  historic  “third  wave  of  democracy  3”
(Huntington,  11 ) that began in the mid- 170s triggered a subsequent and
equally profound wave of decentralization in the  190s and  110s. 
Apart  from  democratization,  another  factor  identifed i n t he l iterature
responsible for decentralization is  economic development. Roy Bahl ( 111)
observes,  “Economic  development  has  eroded  some  of  the  arguments  in
favour of centralization.” Mohammad Arzaghi and Vernon Henderson (2002)
have  prepared  a  model  to  fnd a s t o “ why c ountries a re f scally
decentralizing”  In  their  model  they  argue  that  income  and  population
growth and shifts in relative population across regions of countries,  which
occur  during  economic  development,  explain  the  move  toward  greater
federalism  and  greater  fscal decentralization.  However  in  the  end  they
argue that institutions affect fscal outcomes. Having a federal constitution
encourages  both  effective  federalism  and  fscal d ecentralization. A nd
national democratization leads to potentially regional representation and the
development of regional demands for greater fscal autonomy. 
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Though various  explanations  have been proposed,  yet  the dominant  force
behind  decentralization,  in  fnal analysis i s political ( Shahid Javed Burki,
Guillermo E. Perry, and William R. Dillinger,  111,  Rojas  119, Willis and
others  117). In broad terms it can be suggested that it is an outcome of the
declining credibility  of  the centralized state.  Groups  that  have historically
been  denied  power  now  demand  it  and  the  central  governments  are
increasingly  reluctant  to  combat  this  demand  with  force.  The  state’s
declining credibility in turn, has been attributed to economic failure (with
consequent  alienation  of  important  business  and  labour  support),  to  the
relative absence of war and civil unrest (with the consequent decline in the
acceptance  of  strong  authoritarian  government)  and  to  the  emergence  of
educated urban middle classes ( with the consequent decline of traditional
patron  client  relationships  between  the  government  and  the  governed)
(  O’Donnell,  Schmitter  and  Whitehead  196,  Potter   113).  Specifc c ases
however, do not lend themselves to such global generalizations. 
A broader review of literature, in fact shows that the causes behind the wave
of  decentralization  could  be  more  varied  and  diverse.  That  is,  different
countries  or  regions  may  have  different  motivations  or  objectives  for
adoption of decentralization policies (which in fact (in part) determines how,
in what degree and in what combination of other policies and programs the
process of decentralization will be carried out and what will be the outcome
since  the  path  does  infuence t he f nal o u tcome).While  enunciating  the
diverse causes behind this world wide trend toward decentralization,  Ebel
and  Yilmaz  (200 ),  observe,  “Developing  Countries  are  turning  to
decentralization  to  escape  from  the  traps  of  ineffective  and  ineffcient
governance, macroeconomic instability and inadequate economic growth…
Throughout post communist Central and Eastern Europe, decentralization of
the state is the direct result of the transition from socialist system to market
economy and democracy… In Latin America,  the origin…. is  the political
pressure from the people for democratization… In Africa,  decentralization
has served as a path to national unity…”  In a World Bank Sector Studies
Series it is stated “ Decentralization is particularly wide spread in developing
countries for a variety of reasons: the advent of multiparty system in Africa;
deepening of democratization in Latin America; transition from a command
economy to market economy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet union;
the  need  to  improve  delivery  of  local  services  to  large  populations  in
centralized countries  of  East  Asia;  the challenge of  ethnic and geographic
diversity in South Asia, as well as ethnic tensions in other countries (Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Russia) and attempt to keep centrifugal forces at
bay by forging asymmetrical federations and the plain and simple truth that
central governments have often failed to provide effective public services”.
(Litvek et al.  119 p  ).
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Thus, it can be stated that while in some countries the main concern behind
fscal decentralization i s to perk up the performance of public sector, the
reason behind widespread interest  in  fscal decentralization in some other
countries  is  failure  of  central  planning  to  achieve  its  promised  goals  of
economic stability and growth. Some are turning toward decentralization in
order  to  respond  to  the  challenges  of  the  market  economy  (  since
involvement  of  regional  levels  in  development  of  national  economic
development strategies is seen as important way to respond more favorably
to new challenges, the central governments’ role in building local capacity to
ensure meaningful  local engagement assumes crucial  signifcance) and still
others view it merely as an effective mechanism for countering centrifugal
forces and for easing the frustration of the local aspirants of political power
thereby curbing separatism by devolving more decision making powers to
the  sub  central  levels.  In  this  sense  it  can  also  be  seen  as  a  strategy  to
maintain  political  stability,  to  provide  an  institutional  mechanism  for
bringing opposition groups into a formal,  ritualized  bargaining process.  In
Mozambique  and  Uganda,  for  instance,  decentralization  has  been  the
outcome of long civil wars and has allowed for greater participation of all
former  warring  factions  in  the  governance  of  the  country.  In  such  cases
decentralization  constitutes  an  alternative  to  civil  war  or  other  forms  of
violent opposition.
III. The Globalization Connection:
Another  debatable  question  is  how  the  trend  is  related  to  globalization?
Indeed  there  seems  to  be  a  correlation  between  the  trend  toward
globalization and decentralization, but does this correlation necessarily mean
causation?  There  is  no  unanimity  among  the  scholars  in  this  regard  and
empirical literature does not provide a universal reply. One set of scholars
have shown that globalization is  the cause  behind decentralization;  others
argue  on  the contrary  that  it  is  centralization  that  is  the consequence  of
globalization. There is another set of scholars who argue that globalization
has created conditions for both the tendencies to grow up, while still others
maintain that  the trend for ‘localization’ is independent of and simultaneous
to globalization. In order to take a glimpse of the above mentioned depiction
of  the  inconclusive  state  of  affairs  in  “globalization—decentralization”
literature and to pull out a bottom line assertion, observations of the leading
studies from each group are required to be analyzed. 
Taking up the simultaneity argument frst, the World Development Report
( 111),  perhaps  the  most  quoted  mainstream  document,  suggests  that
governments are increasingly facing the paradoxical desires of their people to
be both global consumers and local citizens. Globalization incites countries 
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to reach out  to  international  partners  to  manage  the growing volumes  of
trade, fnancial fows and global environment 4, while localization, defned as
the push  to  expand popular  participation in politics  and to  increase  local
autonomy in decision making, promotes administrative decentralization. The
report  states  that  the  very  forces  behind  “globalization”  that  are
circumventing the nation state in developing countries are the same forces
that are leading to a public sector focus that is subnational. In such a context,
various forms of federal relationships between different interacting levels of
government seem to provide a way to mediate the variety of global and local
citizen  preferences.  Thus  the  report  has  projected  the  trends  toward
globalization  and  decentralization  as  two  simultaneous  and  independent
trends while asserting that the “forces” behind both the trends are same.
The simultaneity of globalization and decentralization led some scholars to
investigate  the  globalization  –  decentralization  nexus  hypothesis.  The
argument generally  offered is that the international integration of markets
has facilitated decentralization by reducing the economic costs of smallness
(Alesina & Spolaore   117, Bolton & Roland   117).   The argument  is  that
technological changes and global integration of factor markets have changed
the  size  of  government  needed  to  manage  economic  systems.  Now  an
increasing  number  of  public  services  can  be  effciently p rovided b y
decentralized  and  often  private  organizations  (World  Bank   117).
Additionally, it is argued (Aaron Schneidr, 2003) “ Free trade, international
treaties and loan conditions led central governments to choose or be forced
to abdicate their traditional  roles  and left critical functions to non central
government entities if they were to be performed at all”.  Synder ( 111) for
instance  show  how  Mexican  state  governments  stepped  in  to  provide
regulatory frameworks where the central  government abdicated its  role in
coffee production. 
While  most  studies  establish  a  causal  relation  between  globalization  and
decentralization yet there are equally persuasive and authoritative studies by
the  leading  and  prominent  experts  putting  forth  sound  arguments  and
compelling evidence  against globalization-decentralization nexus. Geoffrey
Garrett and Jonathan Rodden (200 ), for instance have shown that using one
natural indicator of political economic authority – the balance of taxing and
spending between central  governments  and state and local  governments  –
international  market  integration  has  been  associated  with  fscal
centralization, rather than decentralization. The authors argue that there are
several reasons why this might be the case. It may become more costly for
the central  government  to  hold  a  heterogeneous  country  together  in  the
global economy. Economic integration might increase demands for a) fscal
stabilization  covering  the  entire  country  and  b)  insurance  for  regions
adversely affected by asymmetric economic shocks. Both fscal stabilization 
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and inter-regional  risk-sharing require a  pooling of economic resources  at
the center. Another strand of literature, that is perhaps most extensive argues
that  globalization  is  generating  tendencies  in  both the directions.  That  is
both centralization and decentralization are simultaneously at work. [Brown
and  Smith  ( 11 ),  Galligan  ( 113),  Knop  et  al  ( 117),  Boeckelman  and
Kinciad ( 116)]. It has been argued that centralizing tendencies are likely to
be more salient in countries like the United States where intrastate authority
was initially  more decentralized, while decentralizing  tendencies are more
salient  in states  that  are initially  more centralized like China and India  7.
Globalization,  according  to  this  line  of  thought,  on  one  hand  promotes
decentralization by creating incentives for sub national governments to play
a  more  active  role  in  attracting  foreign  investment,  promoting  trade,
providing  infrastructure  and  enhancing  human  capital  yet  on  the  other,
globalization also promotes various forms of centralization by increasing the
importance of macroeconomic policy levers, especially monetary policy and
central banks. Though viewing both decentralization and centralization as a
consequence of  globalization is complex proposition  yet existence of both
trends  could  be  explained,  as  Vogel  ( 116)  argues  that  the  outcome  of
changes  incited  by  globalization  are  contingent  on  the  previous
confgurations of authority and the relative development of capacities within
a state. Thus implying that globalization can generate  support for  political
integration,  supranational  governance and centralization on one hand and
for disintegration, localization and decentralization on the other in different
contexts. Michael J. Hiscox (2003) have shown on the basis of a simple formal
model  of  the  provision  of  public  goods  that  the  benefts o f p olitical
integration  (relative  to  disintegration)  for  individuals  in  different  political
units depends critically upon differences in income and income distributions
in  those  units-  and  these  can be altered  signifcantly by globalization. In
essence  where  globalization  has  variegated  or  heterogeneous  effects  on
incomes across a set of political units,  it will raise the redistributive stakes
associated with political integration among them, while reducing the mutual
benefts o f i ntegration. I n s uch c ases, g lobalization c an b e e xpected t o
encourage  demands  for  political  disintegration  or  to  diminish  support  for
political integration. The converse of this also holds; where globalization has
a homogenizing effect on incomes across a set of political units, it will tend to
make  political  integration  more  likely.  In  fact,  it  will  make  political
integration  more  closely  resemble  a  positive-sum rather  than  a  zero-sum
game between the median voters in different political units. The author has
tested this hypothesis  in a rudimentary fashion using evidence on political
decentralization in 76 nations during  190s and  110s. Such a study in fact
provide adequate stimulation for investigation of those conditions (i.e. what
kind  of  political  processes,  political  institutions,  incentive  structures  and
political goals), under which globalization is likely to facilitate more 
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centralization or decentralization or a kind of a mix of the two in a particular
country.
IV. Centralization- Decentralization trend in Federal Systems:
In  current  times  when  decentralization  and  more  specifcally t he f scal
decentralization is said to be in vogue, it becomes essential to observe how
federal systems are responding to the changing scenario. It is to be noted that
some federations are moving towards more decentralization while others are
showing  a  centralizing  trend.   Before  analyzing  the  centralization  or
decentralization  tilts  in  federations  it  is  important  to  understand  what
federalism is and what it is not..
Liphart argues that decentralization and federalism do not always mean the
same thing. In support of his argument he quotes Daniel Elazar, according to
whom “federalism is the fundamental distribution of power among multiple
centers…..  not  the  devolution  of  powers  from a single  centre  or  down a
pyramid.” (Quoted in Liphart p 97). In fact, centralization-decentralization
is  a continuum,  rather  than a  dichotomy and federalism is  a special  case.
Thus,  a  federal  political  system  is  not  always  coterminous  with  a
decentralized  system  and  should  be  viewed  as  making  continuous
adjustments over centralization or decentralization continuum due to their
own ‘endogenous’ reasons. This implies that decentralization can be viewed
as a  complex  process  that  is  a  product  of  many factors  including cultural
heritage  and  geography.  De  Tocqueville  wrote  “It  is  as  impossible  to
determine beforehand, with any degree of accuracy, the share of authority
which each of two governments to enjoy, as to foresee all incidents[s] in the
existence of a nation.” (Democracy in America Ch VIII). While studying the
centralization- decentralization tilt in federal systems,  Ronald Watts ( 119)
argued that the interactions of social, political, economic and ethnic factors
have shaped institutional structures and political processes in such a way that
has  resulted  in  producing  trends  toward  centralization  in  some  federal
systems and decentralization in others. In fact, it is not entirely exceptional
to fnd that in practice, some federations for their own reasons may decide to
give more powers to the center while others will attribute the majority of
authority to their constituent units.  Thus due to some  endogenous reasons
some  federations  remain  highly  centralized  while  others  remain  much
decentralized.  Therefore analogy between federal and decentralized nations
could be erroneous, while “it is appropriate to view federalism as a process of
unifying power within the cluster of states and decentralizing power within
the unifed s tate” (Ademola Ariyo 2003). Fe deralism thus i s not a  fxed
allocation of spheres of central and provincial autonomy or a particular set of
distribution of authority between governments, it is a process, structured by 
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a set of institutions, through which authority is distributed and redistributed.
In  words  of  K.C.  Wheare,  “There  is  and  can be  no  fnal solution to the
allocation  of  fnancial r esources i n a  f ederal s ystem. There c an only b e
adjustments  and  reallocations  in  light  of  changing  conditions.”  (Wheare,
 163  p.  7).  Federations  have  evolved  as  ongoing  incomplete  contracts
(Hart 199, Aghion P. and P. Bolton.  112 Seabright,  116) and by their very
nature are under constant renegotiation. Viewing federations as incomplete
contracts does to some extent help solving the puzzle as to why some mature
federations  like  Australia,  USA  and  Canada  are  evolving  toward  more
centralization when there is an increasing trend toward decentralization in
developing federal countries. The insight yielded by the new institutional
economics  (North,  D.C.   110)  –  that  the  motivations  and  incentives  of
economic  agents,  and  the  options  available  to  them,  are  infuenced in a
fundamental  sense  by  the  incompleteness  of  contracts  –  may  throw
considerable light on such evolution. 
Though  the  above  description  of  centralization-decentralization  trend  in
federal countries has not made any reference to the impact of globalization
yet  it  does  indicate  that  federal  countries,  not  being  a  system  of  fxed
allocation,  can  be  infuenced b y e xternal o r i nternal p ressures t o move
toward  more  centralization  or  decentralization.  This  in  turn  implies  that
intergovernmental  relations  in  federal  countries  are equally  susceptible  to
change.  Thus  there  is  a  case  for  ‘revisiting  intergovernmental  relations  in
federal  counties  in changed global  economic order’.  It  can be argued  that
apart from the role of interactions of social,  political, economic and ethnic
factors  and that  of  ‘incomplete  contracts’  in  infuencing the incentives o f
economic agents, the process of globalization also plays its role by altering
the  matrix  of  incentives  for  policy  makers  at  the  national  level  and  the
decision  making  incentives  of  policy  makers  at  the  subnational  level  by
exposing them to the opportunities presented by globalization. Friedan and
Rogowski ( 116) however, offer to depart from ‘role of incentives’ and give
importance to the pressure created by the interest groups in restructuring of
intergovernmental  relations  because  according  to  them  globalization  has
changed  the  policy  preferences  of  economic  interest  groups,  who  then
initiate  political  process  to  pressurize  state  offcials to implement policies
that  refect t heir c hanging i nterests. B ates a nd K ruegar (  113) h owever
argue  that  pressure/interest  group  model  is  inappropriate  for  developing
countries  where  pressures  for  reform  seldom  come  from  interest  groups.
Policy makers in these countries have frequently implemented policies with
little direction from interest groups. 
While  holding  out  the  above  debate,  it  seems  but  logical  to  suggest  that
globalization  might  add  to  the  economic  incentives  that  motivate  policy
makers to initiate reforms. Even otherwise it is not diffcult to observe that 
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the emergence of global economy has had a major impact on the roles and
activities  of  national  and  subnational  governments.  Globalization  also
provides impetus to central government policy makers for decentralization.
An interest in reassessment of the changing character of federal systems in
context  of  globalization  can  thus  be  seen  in  scholarly  works  such  as
Boeckelman and Kincaid ( 116).  
IV. Role of IMF and WB:  
Apart from all the causes mentioned in the literature it won’t be too wide off
the mark to  state  that   international  agencies  like IMF and WB, who are
investing  enthusiastically  in  spreading  “understanding”  through
dissemination of  academic literature supporting their philosophy are in fact
themselves one of the crucial forces working behind the trend. A growing
number  of  Bank-funded  projects  are  in  effect  supporting  sectoral
decentralization strategies.  These agencies themselves oblige (by politics of
aid) the countries who seek their help to undertake reforms as they dictate.
The Bank supports decentralization through loans for structural adjustment
to the central  governments  and specifc projects and s tate level s tructural
adjustment  loans  to  subnational  governments  (Andhra  Pradesh  in  India).
James Manor and Richard Crook ( 2000) in a WB, OED working paper have
made  suggestions  as  to  “What  Can  the  World  Bank  Do  to  Facilitate
Democratic  Decentralization?”  (pp,  24-27).  World  Bank,  has  exclusively
fgured f scal d e centralization a n d t h e d e sire f o r l o cal d i scretion a n d
devolution of power (along with and in parallel to the globalization) as  the
most important factors shaping governance and development today (World
Bank,   111),  and  along  with  many  others  (such  as,  USAID  and  Asian
Development bank) has supported fscal decentralization as a part of world
wide “reform agenda to strengthen governance” (Bahl,  111 b ). According to
World  Development  Report   111/2000  (Ch.  7,  p   24)  “Strategies  to  stop
decentralization are unlikely to succeed, as the pressures to decentralize are
beyond government control.  Rather than attempt to resist  it,  governments
should face  decentralization armed with  lessons  from countries  that  have
gone before them”. 
Roy Bahl ( 111 b) recognizes  that the external advisors  play an important
catalytic role.  When funding is  brought as carrot  government offcials are
stimulated by them to take a harder look at decentralization issue. Here Bahl
adds an interesting observation. He says,  “ Unless the government itself  is
enthusiastic, the harder look will not lead to meaningful policy reform and in
fact  will  be  quickly  forgotten  when  the  money  is  gone.  Often
implementation stage is never reached”. (p27). 
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In  fact  the  ‘Washington  Consensus’  (generally  seen  synonymous  with
neoliberalism 6 though not originally intended to mean so 7) is known for its
distrust  in  governments’  capacity  to  run  large  industrial  and  commercial
enterprises and thus sponsors shrinking of the government and  privatization
(divestment) just as the classical liberals of the  9th century, represented by
the  American  Founding  Fathers,  were  willing  to  give  only  framework-
maintenance role to the government as they were highly skeptical about the
capability and willingness of politics and politicians to further the interests of
the ordinary citizen and considered governments to be a necessary evil, made
necessary by the elementary fact  that all  persons  are not  angels  (Madison
 166[ 797]:   60).  The  devices  aimed  to  accomplish  this  purpose  are  the
familiar  ones;  splitting  sovereignty  and  designing  federalism  to  allow  for
decentralization of coercive state power. The dominant policy view of IMF
and WB and U.S. Treasury department became easy to impose over rest of
the world as  most  centrally  planned countries  fell apart  economically and
politically in  190’s and  110’s along with shocking demise of former Soviet
Union.  These  bodies  (IMF  and  WB)  found  in  Buchanan’s  works,  their
intellectual  foundation,  who  was  known  for  his  views  on  potentially
deleterious  effects  of  majoritarian  politics  on  the  economy  and  society  9.
Buchanan received Nobel  Prize  in  196 for  development of  public  choice
theory.  His  message  was  of  combating  government  intervention  in  the
market as against  Richard Musgrave’s  theory of public fnance that gave a
very  activist  role  to  the  public  sector  (market  economy  being  subject  to
serious  malfunctioning in various  basic  respects).  According to  Buchanan,
fscal d ecentralization i s a  m echanism f or d isarming a  h uge c entral
government with monopolistic powers. In a system of decentralized public
fnance, s tate or local governments must compete for residents, frms and
tax base.
Conclusion:
In this paper it was pointed out that till mid 90s the development paradigm
was that of extreme forms of centralization (centrally managed public sector
as  engine  of  development)  then  came  the  development  paradigm
emphasizing  extreme  forms  of  decentralization  (privatization)  and  fnally
the  development  paradigm  seems  to  have  come  of  age  with  a  renewed
appreciation of public sector that however is sub-national in focus.
While considering the broad systemic forces behind decentralization trends
it was pointed out that different scholars have tried to analyse the trend from
their  own  vantage  points.  Thus  while  some  scholars  put  the  current
decentralization trend within the framework of ‘democratization wave’ some
others  point  towards  ‘economic  development’  as  a  cause  that  infact  has
eroded some arguments in favour of centralization.  Apart from these there is
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another set of scholars that correlate decentralization with globalization. But
there is wide diversity among the four set of scholars; (a) the scholars who
establish a causal relation between globalization and decentralization, (b) the
scholars relating globalization to centralization (c) scholars who have shown
that globalization is associated with both the tendencies and fnally (d) those
to  whom  globalization  and  decentralization  are  independent  events  that
somehow managed to mix together. Extending this discussion in the context
of federal countries it is asserted that in wake of any external happening of
the magnitude such as that is of globalization, the federal structure cannot
but gets altered precisely because federalism is not a fxed allocation of the
spheres of central and provincial autonomy, instead it is a ‘process’ structured
by  a  set  of  institutions  through  which  authority  is  distributed  and
redistributed. 
While admitting the difference of opinion among the scholars it can safely be
asserted that most countries especially the developing ones around the world
are  facing  external  as  well  as  internal  pressures  to  decentralize  and  are
actually becoming part of the trend which if not universal is nonetheless the
dominant trend. General causes include systemic forces like democratization
and  economic  development;  specifc c auses h owever a re d ifferent f or
different countries. In some countries the policies of opening up of economy
and  globalization  are  interacting  with  domestic  political  and  economic
institutions in such a way so as to create incentives for decentralization. In
addition  there  is  external  pressure  coming  from  IMF and  WB who  have
clearly declared ‘decentralization’ as their most favoured policy prescription
especially for the developing world.
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NOTES:
 . Richard Musgrave, for instance in his 600 pages long monumental treatise on
public  fnance, dedicated a  total of only fve pages to the ‘multilevel fnance’.
(Musgrave  171,p 71- 93)
2. The term frst appeared in the late  190s in articles by Japanese economists in
the Harvard  Business  Review.  According  to  the sociologist  Roland Robertson,
who is credited with popularizing the term, glocalization describes the tempering
effects  of  local  conditions  on  global  pressures.  At  a   117  conference  on
"Globalization and Indigenous Culture," Robertson said that glocalization "means
the simultaneity --- the co-presence --- of both universalizing and particularizing
tendencies." 
3.  Beginning with the revolution in Portugal in  174 and moving on to Latin
America  before  returning  to  Eastern  Europe  in   171,  represents  a  ‘wave’  of
democracy which for Huntington is the third wave of democracy effecting some
30 countries in all.
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4. This in fact has made it diffcult for the states to effectively pursue key policy
objectives,  like  dealing  with  economic  recession,  fnancial c risis a nd
environmental problems, without coordinating their actions with those of other
states at some supranational level, thereby resulting in demand for supranational
forms of governance.
7.  The  World  Development  Report  ( 111-2000)  states,  “Trends  in  mature
decentralized countries suggest that costs  are important consideration…. Some
countries have recently been reducing the number of sub national units, largely
on the grounds of effciency and costs. But in a number of developing countries
sub national governments are proliferating”
6.  The  evolution  of  neoliberalism  as  a  “policy  revolution”  however  had  its
beginning in violent ouster of social democratic government of Chile in  173 and
consequent  imposition  of  free  market  policies  and  other  elements  of  neo
liberalism by group of 27 Chicago boys (of which Milton Friedman was most
prominent)  and  culminating  in  government  policies  of  Reagan  and  Thatcher
governments who used their control over Bretton Woods institutions to impose
their policies on the rest of the world.
7.  Jhon Williamson [2000]  claimed  that  the  term Washington  Consensus  has
developed into  something different  from that  which he intended.  He says,  “I
invented  the  term  “Washington  Consensus”  to  refer  to  the  lowest  common
denominator  of  policy  advice  being  addressed  by  the  Washington-based
institutions to Latin American countries as of  191. I fnd that the term is now
used as a synonym for what is often called “neoliberalism” in Latin America, or
what Geeorge Soros ( 119) has called “market fundamentalism.” In “What Should
the  World  Bank  Think  about  the  Washington  Consensus?”  The  World  Bank
Research Observer, vol.  7, no. 2 (August 2000), pp. 27 –64. On the other hand,
Paul Davidson (2003) (Editor, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics) says that the
term not only mean different things to different people but also “even different
things to John Williamson at different times” (p. ) In “What is wrong with the
Washington  Consensus  and  what should  we do about  it?” Paper  presented at
conference on “Reforming The Reforms: What Next For Latin America?”, Rio de
Janeiro, July 27, 2003  
http://econ.bus.utk.edu/washington%20consensus.pdf
9. Buchanan , in his book ‘The Calculus of Consent’ published in  162. But at that
time ( 160’s and 70’s) it was Musgrave era of activist public sector and Buchanan,
in words of Oates ( 111) “found only a small audience to give him a sympathetic
hearing”. Oates Wallace E. ( 111) “Musgrave and Buchanan On the Role of the
State”  Regulation Vol 23 No 4 (pp40-44).
